Operational data from Information Resistance:
During the past weekend (May 28 – 29, 2016), Russian-terrorist troops in Donbas continued actively violating the Minsk agreements by shelling the ATO forces’ positions from 120 mm mortars and 122 mm artillery systems, along the entire line of contact. Armed confrontations were observed in several locations.
Militants repeatedly used 120 mm mortars in the vicinity of Avdiivka (enemy gunners and spotters operating near the bridge). Numerous militant attacks with small arms and stand-mounted grenade launchers (AGS-17 and SPG-9M) were recorded in the summer cottages area near Avdiivka’s industrial zone, as well as near the ATO forces’ positions at the Butovska mine (ventilation shaft of the Putylivska mine), the “Zenith” position, and other areas in the southwestern direction of operations.
Enemy sniper groups (armed with large-caliber sniper rifles) are highly active in the industrial zone of Avdiivka, near Mar’inka, and southeast of Novhorodske. At the same time, terrorists are using anti-tank missiles on several sections of the front to destroy the ATO forces’ armored vehicles and equipment. In some instances, [anti-tank missiles were] aimed at Ukrainian troops’ fortified firing positions.
Russian-terrorist forces stepped up their activity in the area of Horlivka. In the area of Luhanske and on the Svitlodarsk salient, militants are attempting to force the ATO forces from their positions by actively shelling them from different (mainly flank) positions in the open country, and by using trained sabotage and reconnaissance groups. At the same time, militants are heavily shelling Mayorsk, Zaitseve, and Novhorodskefrom the western and northwestern outskirts of Horlivka.
Militants repeatedly opened fire from 122 mm cannon artillery (in 4-5 shell salvos) from their positions southwest and east of Styla, as ranging fire on the ATO forces’ positions. Terrorists also used 122 mm artillery from positions in the vicinity of the 206.9 m high ground (fire adjustment), and from positions south of the Starolaspa village. According to IR group’s data, current usage of cannon artillery by terrorists is related to the “training process” used for “qualifying practice fire” in the course of shooting practice for units of the Russian Armed Forces and militants trained by Russian instructors.
In the area east of Talakivka and Lomakyne (north of Vodyane), militants fired at the ATO forces’ two advanced strongholds from two positions near the Oktyabr village and in the area northwest of the Kominternove settlement. During these attacks, the enemy used 82 mm mortars and small arms. An enemy group attempted to approach our advanced positions near Shyrokyne, moving in from the direction of Sakhanka, then retreated to the starting line after a brief skirmish.
Terrorists continue their reconnaissance activity, including the use of UAVs (up to 5-7 daily UAV flights), which monitor the ATO forces’ operational-tactical zone. The main targets of enemy intelligence include Ukrainian troop command points, locations of supply warehousing and storage (in the tactical and operational-tactical zones), as well as the areas and lines of Ukrainian troop concentration and deployment.
Terrorists’ use of UAVs follows a certain pattern:
• Most UAVs are used during the hours of darkness, making it difficult for Ukrainian troops to counteract them;
• Accordingly, enemy UAVs are predominantly equipped with night-vision optical devices, including thermal imaging cameras;
• In addition to UAVs with reconnaissance capabilities, militants began actively using UAVs capable of dropping incendiary ammunition. Because these ordnances are small-sized, high-performance and heavily used, [these UAVs] are capable of starting a large number of fires throughout a relatively small area;
• The enemy is increasingly using UAVs for diversion and identification of the ATO forces’ air defense systems, and to provoke Ukrainian troops into opening fire so as to uncover the ATO forces’ fire organization and delivery system on different sections of the front line.
The Russian military command decided on a gradual increase in the “cash allowance” for privates and sergeants in the “DNR 1st Army Corps” and the “LNR 2nd Army Corps.” The respective instruction indicates that the increase in “salaries” applies exclusively to local militants and Russian mercenaries who had signed “contracts” with the military leadership of the “DNR” and the “LNR,” as well as with the “staffing authorities of the South Military District of the Russian Federation” (it is currently unknown what this term refers to). This order does not apply to the rest of the “volunteers,” “Cossacks,” and others. At the same time, the Russian presidential administration ordered the command of both territorial units to “get things in order” concerning personnel records and payment of cash allowances.