Operational data from Information Resistance:
In a number of places in the ATO [anti-terrorist operation] zone, Russian terrorist forces were observed indiscriminately directing poorly aimed fire from small arms and AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers, while in the Donetsk area terrorist forces used 122 mm artillery against ATO forces’ positions. In three stretches – between the towns of Shchastya and Stanytsia Luhanska, and near the towns of Mar’inka and Luhanske– activity by enemy sniper groups was noted.
The main problem for ATO forces at this stage is demining [the ground]. It is estimated that the total surface area of sites which are not cleared of unexploded ordnance, as well as mines and explosive devices planted by Russian-terrorist troops, is at least 10,000 hectares; in a substantial part of this territory the Ukrainian armed forces have conducted sapper work.
Rotation of the GRU [Main Intelligence Directorate] Spetsnaz [special forces] units of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation [GRU GS AF RF] in the occupied areas of Donbas has been completed. Combined GRU brigade forces continued active work in their sectors. Sabotage and intelligence [DRG] forces are conducting detailed reconnaissance of Ukrainian troop positions, laying mines and explosive devices of all types, including antipersonnel mines prohibited by the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (the “Convention on ‘Inhumane’ Weapons,” Protocol II), and by the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines (the Ottawa Treaty).
On the training field near the town of Perevalsk, military training of “recruits” destined for the formations of the so-called “2nd Army Corp” (“LNR”[“Luhansk People’s Republic”]) continues. Both officers and sergeants of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, as well as local terrorists with extensive combat experience, serve as training instructors.
Tank “biathlon” today in Torez, near Perevalsk includes Russian military Strela-10 SAM system on display:
In Donetsk, the relocation of several dozen different types of AFV [armored fighting vehicles], and of up to 800 armed persons in Russian military uniforms with Russian Armed Forces chevrons were observed.
The transfer of a militant armored vehicle group consisting of five tanks and fourteen AFV of various types to the area near the town of Oktyabr was recorded.
An armored group of terrorists comprised of 10 tanks and armored fighting vehicles has been transferred north of the town of Novoazovsk.
The deterioration of morale in a number of armed militant groups is observed. In the past few days, three mercenaries deserted from the “Oplot” brigade stationed in Mospyne. Militants are submitting “resignation” requests en masse and, to prevent defections, identification documents have been taken away from all personnel on the orders of the “command” of the illegal armed formation “Oplot.”
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According to IR group operational data, political parties in the Russian Federation are trying to set up and legalize their party cells in the territories occupied by the Russian-terrorist forces.
In particular, the leaders of the “League of Communists of Luhansk,” I. Gumenyuk and E. Lisitsyn, reached agreement with the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR], V. Zhirinovskiy, on the establishment of the Donbas Liberal-Democrat “territorial organization,” which the above-mentioned comrades are planning to head. The approximate composition of the LDPR leadership in Luhansk will look something like this: I. Gumenyuk, E. Lisitsyn, M. Zolkin and V. Popov (LOC CPU – Luhansk Oblast Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine).
In addition, Gumenyuk plans to seize control of the leadership of the entire Communist Party network in the occupied territories and to remove persons close to S. Kilinkarov from leadership positions in the regional cells of the Communist Party. The latter is credited with a “too pro-Ukrainian” position.
In connection with Gumenyuk’s plans, merciless criticism has been unleashed against influential Communists [from the] Filipskiy [family], the First Secretary of the Luhansk City Committee (LCC) of the Ukrainian Communist Party, M. Chalenko, and Secretary of the LCC of the Ukrainian Communist Party for ideological matters, A. Aulova. A “republican” conference of the “Communist League of the Luhansk Region” is planned on September 26th at the address of the former Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (498 Artema Street, Luhansk). The intention is to “elect” the head of this “political organization.” The event will be supervised by representatives of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, in particular the 1st Secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, L. Illarionova. The main issue of the “republican conference” will be the formation of a structural subunit of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation based on the “Communist League of the Luhansk Region” and the de facto reformatting of all Communist Party of Ukraine cells in occupied territory in Luhansk Oblast [region] into cells of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.
Leaders of these cells have already been approved by the Moscow “guests” and their puppets, so their “election” will be a formality. Notably, Y. Sinenko, the commander of one of the units of the so-called “People’s Militia” of the “Luhansk People’s Republic” will become the 1st secretary of the Kamyanobrodsky District Committee. He is responsible for transporting the “food aid” sent by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation from the Russian Communists’ Rostov office.
It should be noted that the food products from the Russian Communists do not reach the civilian population – after “a triumphant presentation” staged for the local and Kremlin media, the supplies are distributed among the illegal armed groups. In addition to food, the consignments contain uniforms and regimentals for the terrorists, communications equipment, and even components for UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles].